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Abstract
Debate over superiority of pension funding over pay-as-you-go links notably to the question
whether funding improves economic performance sufficiently to generate additional resources
to meet the needs of an ageing population. To address this issue, we design a modified
Cobb–Douglas production function with pension assets as a shift factor, and investigate the
direct link between pension assets and economic growth employing a dataset covering up to
38 countries, using a variety of appropriate econometric methods. We find positive results for
both OECD countries and Emerging Market Economies (EMEs), with consistent evidence
for a larger effect for EMEs than OECD countries.
Introduction
The current global demographic shift toward population ageing, largely reflecting
rising life expectancy and declining fertility (Munnell, 2004) has led many countries
across the world to re-evaluate their pension systems. Typically, they switch wholly or
partially from unfunded systems, e.g. pay-as-you-go (PAYG) to funded systems, with
reform in Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) often supported by World Bank
finance (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005). Given the funded nature of many new pension
schemes, pension fund assets have increased across many countries ; current levels are
given in Tables 1 and 2.
Given demographic trends and the structure of funded schemes, it is virtually cer-
tain that pension funds will continue rapid expansion during the coming decades. In
* This paper is a large expansion of the earlier conference paper presented at the CCISSR Forum 2004,
26–27 June, Beijing University, Beijing. The ideas and concepts developed in this paper have benefited
from suggestions from Jagjit Chadha, Andros Gregoriou, John Hunter, Estelle James, Kul Luintel, Chris
Martin, Norma Sephuma, Harry Verbon, and participants in seminars at Brunel University and Tilburg
University. Thanks are also given to Mukul Asher and Gregorio Impavido for assistance in finding
pension data, as well as an anonymous referee for helpful comments. They are of course not responsible
for the authors’ errors. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect
those of the OECD or the governments of its Member countries.
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this context, a key issue in pension reform is whether such a shift from PAYG to
funding is largely a matter of reallocation of the burden of ageing (with the risk of a
generation paying twice), or whether funding improves economic performance suf-
ficiently to generate at least some of the additional resources required tomeet the needs
of an ageing population. There are several aspects to this question. One is whether
funding leads to an increase in saving which permits higher capital formation. A
second is whether, independently of the impact on saving, there are favourable effects
of funding on capital and labour markets, for example via acceleration of financial
development, generating in turn a more efficient allocation of capital. A third is
whether, following these effects, a direct impact of funding on growth can be dis-
cerned. Whereas there is quite extensive work on funding’s effect on saving and on
financial development (see references in Hu, 2005a; Davis and Hu, 2006; Davis,
2005), the direct role of pension funds in economic growth has been little examined. Is
pension fund growth positively associated with economic growth1? In this paper, we
seek to provide insight into these questions with both a theoretical model and related
empirical work for most OECD countries and selected EMEs.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 provides a brief literature review on the
issue of whether and how pension fund growth may impact on economic growth
(measured by increases in economic output (GDP) produced per head). Section 2 deals
with the model specification, which is derived from the Cobb–Douglas production
Table 1. Total assets of pension funds within selected advanced OECD countries
Total assets
(US$ mn)
As % of
GDP Year
Australia 368,370 58.1 2003
Austria 7,063 3.7 2001
Belgium 12,470 5.4 2001
Canada 393,950 47.2 2003
Switzerland 246,425 79.6 2003
Germany 60,531 3.3 2001
Denmark 56,932 26.8 2003
Spain 58,145 7.0 2003
UK 1,242,320 69.2 2003
Iceland 1,949 128.6 2004
Italy 47,290 4.3 2001
Japan 2,996,724 69.3 2003
Netherlands 575,496 112.5 2003
Portugal 12,299 11.2 2001
Sweden 54,180 23.7 2000
US 8,834,800 81.2 2004
Total assets within
OECD countries
14,982,944 62.1
Source : Hu (2005a).
1 In our own empirical work, economic growth is proxied by increases in output per head, unless stated
otherwise.
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function, and views pension fund assets as a shift factor, an idea developed from
McCoskey and Kao (1999) and Arestis et al. (2004). In Section 3, data are introduced
and tested for stationarity. We find variables to be I(1), implying a need to allow for
cointegration. In Section 4, our first econometric work is conducted with the help of
cointegrating dynamic OLS (DOLS) model, which we consider most appropriate for
the question in hand. Complementing this, in Section 5, we follow the dynamic het-
erogeneous estimation procedures designed by Pesaran and Smith (1995) to look at the
average long-run relations and allow for cross-country heterogeneity. In Section 6, we
move to country-by-country co-integration tests, investigating whether there is a long-
run relationship between pension funds and economic growth and again allowing for
cross-country heterogeneity. Impulse responses of output per head to pension assets in
the related Vector Error CorrectionModels (VECM) are calculated as well as variance
decompositions. In each case, we assess results with and without a time trend, which
may capture other influences on the production relation such as structural reform.
1. Literature review
1.1 Empirical work on the pension funds-growth nexus
Looking at the existing literature, empirical work that investigates the direct link
between pension fund growth and economic growth at a transnational level is quite
Table 2. Total assets of pension funds within selected EMEs
Total assets
(US$ million)
As % of
GDP
Year of
observation
Argentina 15,328 11.8 2003
Bolivia 1,258 15.7 2003
Brazil 64,444 13.1 2003
Chile 39,672 54.8 2003
Colombia 6,403 8.3 2003
Ecuador 16 0.1 2003
Fiji 1,561 69.3 2003
Hungary 780 0.9 2003
Indonesia 278 0.1 2002
Korea 13,290 2.2 2001
Sri Lanka 2,698 14.6 2000
Mexico 35,405 5.7 2003
Malaysia 58,476 56.7 2003
Panama 464 3.6 2003
Peru 5,296 8.7 2003
Philippines 3,077 3.8 2003
Poland 20,586 9.8 2004
Singapore 60,877 66.6 2003
Uruguay 1,149 10.3 2003
Total assets
within EMEs
331,058 14.1
Source : Hu (2005a).
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scarce, and uses widely varying summary measures of economic performance. Besides
GDP growth or GDP per worker/head of population, these include Total Factor
Productivity (TFP), investment, and average productivity of capital. Davis (2002),
for example, with a dataset covering both pension funds and life insurance com-
panies, looked at the relation between institutionalization (measured by the share of
institutional investors’ equity holdings in corporate equity as a whole) and economic
performance at the macro level, measured by TFP and GDP growth. Although his
results are consistent with higher TFP as institutions’ share of equity rises, he finds no
direct effect of the proportion of equity held by life insurers and pension funds on
GDP growth. Again, Davis (2004) using a dataset of 16 OECD countries and a
standard Levine–Zervos (1998) specification for finance and growth does not find a
positive direct link between institutionalization (rising life insurance and pension
assets/GDP) and GDP growth. On the other hand, using the technique developed by
Hurlin and Venet (2003) and Hurlin (2005), Hu (2005b) shows that Panel Granger
Causality tests do indicate homogeneous causality from pension assets to GDP
growth in 38 countries as well as in the subgroups OECD (18 countries) and EMEs
(19 countries). Reverse causality is weaker, and notably for emerging markets there is
no strong evidence that GDP growth homogenously causes pension assets.
Looking at national studies of the direct link of pension reform to growth, most
extant studies have focused on Chile. Holzmann (1997) found a positive relationship
between pension reform and economic growth. With the simple Solow residual
specification of TFP, it was found that improving financial market conditions fol-
lowing the pension reform significantly positively affected TFP. But this model suffers
from low ‘t ’ values, which might result from multicollinearity between independent
variables, e.g. the unemployment rate and stock market index. Meanwhile, Schmidt-
Hebbel (1999) reached the conclusion that pension reform in Chile boosted private
investment, the average productivity of capital, and TFP. One single regression was
estimated to obtain the coefficients of parameters, then these coefficients are used to
calculate the rise of each variable attributed respectively to structural reform, (e.g. tax
reform) and pension reform. In all, he concluded that pension reform in Chile had a
positive impact on the private investment rate, average productivity of capital, and
the TFP growth rate.2
A promising methodology that has not yet been applied in the pensions/growth
nexus is a generalized Cobb–Douglas production function, with relevant additional
variables, such as urbanization rates or the nature of the financial system, set as shift
factors into the standard function. Arestis et al. (2004) and McCoskey and Kao
(1999), among others, use a similar specification to test whether owing to better
resource allocation, incentives etc., urbanization or aspects of the financial structure
make the capital stock more productive in terms of output per capita. We adapt this
work for pension funds in the current paper.
As further background to our work, and to trace the channels whereby pension
fund growth could affect economic growth, we now briefly survey the wider literature
2 For example, pension reform contributed to 0.1–0.4% of the 1.5% increase in TFP growth rate, while
0.4–1.5% of the total 13% rise in private investment rate was attributed to pension reforms with the
remainder being explained by structural reform.
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on the macroeconomic impacts of pension reform, focusing on capital market de-
velopment, improved corporate governance, labour market efficiency, and household
and national savings.
1.2 Pension funds and economic efficiency
Pension funds can positively affect growth via improved economic efficiency
and resource allocation, effectively making the capital stock more productive.
Economic efficiency and resource allocation can in turn be improved by financial
development. The link between pension funds and capital market development has
been widely analysed in the recent literature, as reviewed in Davis and Hu (2006).
Both prices and quantities of long-term financing may be favourably affected,
which may in turn raise productive investment and improve resource allocation.
For example, focusing on emerging market economies (EMEs), Walker and Lefort
(2002) argue that pension funds can decrease the cost of capital via three channels.
The first channel is a more developed capital market resulting from pension re-
forms, thus making the issuing of securities cheaper. Secondly, even allowing for
short-term performance evaluation (Davis and Steil, 2001), the expected investment
time horizon of pension funds is longer than that of individuals and firms, thus
reducing the ‘term premium’. Third, the equity risk premium is reduced due to
pension funds’ pooling and professional management. Both the term premium and
risk premium’s reduction might lead to a decrease in the average cost of capital,
which spurs productive investment. In addition, they give some evidence that
pension funds reduce security price volatility, implying a lower risk premium for
their panel of emerging market economies, although an opposite result is found
by Davis (2004) for G-7 countries, and Hu (2006) for 16 OECD countries and eight
EMEs.
Turning from prices to quantities, Catalan et al. (2000) give evidence that con-
tractual saving institutions, e.g. pension funds, positively Granger-cause equity
market capitalization as well as value traded, while Impavido et al. (2003) and Hu
(2005a) find a positive relationship between contractual saving assets and bond
market capitalization/GDP. In sum, the current literature suggests a positive relation
between pension fund growth and financial development. Given it is widely con-
sidered that financial development is positively associated with economic growth
(Levine and Zervos, 1998; Beck and Levine, 2004), then pension funds might enhance
economic growth via their impact on financial development, independently of an
effect on national saving (discussed below).
Pension funds may also boost economic growth via improved corporate govern-
ance, improving the way capital is managed. Clark and Hebb (2003) note that one
factor facilitating pension funds’ corporate engagement is the widespread use of in-
dexation techniques in the pension funds industry, which hinders ‘exit ’ via sale of
shares in underperforming companies that are in the index. A second is the increasing
demand by owners for more transparency and accountability, particularly after the
Enron, Worldcom, and Parmalat scandals. Third, there is pension funds’ pressure to
undertake socially responsible investing (SRI). Fourth, pressures to ‘humanize ’
Does funding of pensions stimulate economic growth? 225
capital with social, moral, and political objectives extend pension funds’ simple con-
cerns for rate of return.
A positive impact of pension fund activism on corporate performance at the firm
level is well documented at least in the US.3 But our concern in this paper is whether
pension fund growth is a potential engine of economic growth via its effect on cor-
porate performance at the macro level, an issue ignored or dismissed by most current
pensions’ research. An exception is Davis (2002, 2004) who argues that effects of
governance initiatives from institutional investors may go wider than the ‘ target
firms’ to the whole economy. This is because unaffected firms have natural incentives
to improve their performance so as to avoid the threat from pension fund activism in
the future (Marsh, 1990). Therefore, if a significant proportion of firms, whether
directly or indirectly affected by pension fund activism, tend to improve their per-
formance, the overall effect might be higher economic growth, via making the capital
stock more productive. Consistent with this, Davis found inter alia that a higher
institutional holding of total corporate equity boosts Total Factor Productivity
(TFP) and R and D in seven major countries.
Turning to the labour market, it is well known that due to the weak link between
pension contributions and benefits under defined-benefit PAYG systems, there is a
tendency towards earlier retirement and job immobility, and this is apparent in EU
labour markets (Disney, 2002). One contributing factor was the disincentives im-
bedded in public pension systems (Blondal and Scarpetta, 1998). In addition to the
pension system’s impact on labour supply, Disney (2003) argues that the distor-
tionary ‘tax component’ of public pension contributions can also affect labour de-
mand if the employee can pass through the burden of pension contribution to
consumers, for example via product prices, because product demand falls and pro-
ducers might consider reducing the demand for labour. In view of such problems,
James (1998) suggests that ‘the close linkage between benefits and contributions, in a
defined-contribution plan is designed to reduce labour market distortions’. In
consequence, economic growth might be increased, for example due to more efficient
allocation of labour to its most remunerative uses after pension reform to funded
defined-contribution plans. Such effects might be smaller where defined-benefit
funded schemes predominate. Moreover, some of the labour market benefits can also
be obtained by PAYG defined-contribution plans as in Sweden and Poland
(Holzmann and Hinz, 2005).
1.3 Pension funds and saving
A final aspect is a possible effect of funding on saving, which given the link of saving
to investment in a closed economy4 may boost growth directly by raising the capital
3 See Wahal (1996), Smith (1996), and more recent work by Woikdtke (2002) and Coronado et al. (2003)
for estimates of the impact of pension activism on corporate performance at the firm level. The effec-
tiveness of pension funds’ positive impact on corporate governance has been challenged by Orszag (2002)
and empirical works in the US, such as Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999).
4 Whereas such relations can be weakened by international capital flows, the extensive literature on the
‘Feldstein–Horioka puzzle’ shows that domestic investment continues to be strongly related to domestic
(i.e. national) saving.
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stock. Whereas there is some evidence of a small positive effect of pension funding on
household saving (Kohl and O’Brien, 1998), the relevant variable for economic
growth is national saving, which largely determines investment, as would be predicted
by a standard Solow (2000) growth model. James (1998) argues that one main ad-
vantage of the World Bank multi-pillar model of pension reform is that national
saving as well as personal saving could be boosted. But any positive effect of pension
fund growth on personal saving could be offset at the level of national saving by the
impact on public finances of the costs involved in the transition to a privately funded
system (Holzmann, 1997), as well as the costs of tax subsidies to personal saving.
A key aspect of this issue is hence how pension-reforming governments finance
existing social security obligations. If the government tries to finance the implicit
pension debts by public debts, then public savings would decrease, so the overall
national saving rate might be unchanged or even fall.
There is conflicting empirical evidence on this point. Schmidt-Hebbel (1999) esti-
mated that pension reform in Chile raised the national saving rate. Given the diffi-
culty of pinning down how the pension reform was financed in Chile, he considered
three cases, i.e. fiscal contraction-based financing of pension reform at the levels of
100%, 75%, and 50%. On balance, he suggests that between 10% and 45% of the
rise in national saving could be explained by pension reform, with the remaining
being explained by structural reform, e.g. tax reform etc. Lopez-Murphy and
Musalem (2004) study 50 countries and find that national saving is boosted where
pension funds are the result of a mandatory pension programme, but not when they
are voluntary. On the other hand, Samwick (1999), working with a panel of countries,
found that no countries except Chile experienced an increase in gross national saving
rates after pension reform towards non-PAYG systems. He included control vari-
ables such as the log of per capita income, per capita income growth, the private
credit to income ratio, demographic indicators, and the urbanization rate to avoid
omitted variables bias. Furthermore, Bosworth and Burtless (2004) found that
OECD countries that seek to prefund social security obligations such as Japan and
the US incur offsetting increases in government borrowing that again offset any dif-
ference in national saving.
Taking into account the above literature review, this paper seeks to contribute to
the current growth and pensions literature in three areas. First, in the light of work by
Arestis et al. (2004) and McCoskey and Kao (1999) we design a modified
Cobb–Douglas production function with the inclusion of pension assets as a shift
factor, which, since it focuses on the efficient use of the capital stock, can capture
benefits of pension fund growth independent of the above-mentioned disputed evi-
dence on saving. Second, we employ a set of appropriate panel econometric methods
to test the model on data for up to 38 countries. Third, we directly link pension assets
to economic growth in a co-integration relationship on a country-by-country basis
and investigate the extent to which they are correlated in the long run as well as the
impulse responses and variance decomposition in the related VECM.5
5 Technically, whereas our panel methods abstract from a potential impact of pension funds on growth via
saving (since the capital stock is a predetermined variable), the VECM, wherein all variables are en-
dogenous, permits evaluation of the combination of both an efficiency channel and a possible savings
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2. Model specification
The Cobb–Douglas production function shown in (1) is widely used in the economic
literature
Q=AKbL1xb (1)
where A is technology, K is the capital stock, and L is the labour force. In this study,
we modify (1) slightly so as to facilitate our analysis of the implication of pension
fund assets for output Q. In addition, in view of our panel analysis, we use a double
subscript on its variables
Qi, t=Ai, tr(Pi, t)lir(Kbi i, t)r(L1xbi i, t) (2)
where I is the time series dimension, t the cross-section dimension, Q aggregate out-
put proxied by GDP, A state of technology, P pension funds proxied by pension fund
assets/GDP, K capital stock,6 L labour supply proxied by total population; l is the
elasticity of aggregate output with respect to pension fund assets, and b is the elas-
ticity of aggregate output with respect to the capital stock. Equation (2) suggests that
aggregate output is affected both by technology A and pension fund assets P, which
act as shift factors, as well as capital K and labour L. Note again that the model does
not assume pension fund growth raises saving – trends in national saving will be
captured by the capital stock variable, to the extent external balance is maintained. In
effect, we test whether owing to better resource allocation, incentives etc., pension
fund growth makes the capital stock more productive. Arestis et al. (2004) and
McCoskey and Kao (1999), among others, use the similar specification, i.e. a gen-
eralized Cobb–Douglas production function with relevant additional variables such
as urbanization rates or the nature of the financial system set as shift factors into the
standard function. Technology may then be specified as follows
Ai, t=eai+cit+ei, t (3)
This specification is in line with McCoskey and Kao (1999), where a is the intercept,
t is the time trend, and e is the residual term. Specifying the state of technology in this
way assigns each of our country sample with the country-specific intercept and time
trend (allowing for heterogeneity across countries that might relate to factors such as
structural reform) and also introduces a stochastic element, i.e. e into the model as
indicated in Equation (5) below. Replacing technology A in Equation (2) by its
expression in terms of t as shown in Equation (3) gives
Qi, t=eai+cit+ei, tr(Pi, t)lir(Kbi i, t)rL1xbi i, t (4)
Then, normalizing by Li,t and taking logs from both sides in Equation (4), we have
Qi, t
Li, t
=eai+cit+ei, tr(Pi, t)lir
Ki, t
Li, t
 bi
channel. Pension funds/GDP in the impulse responses and variance decompositions can affect output per
head both directly and via boosting the capital stock per head.
6 Capital stock is calculated based on the perpetual inventory method. Consistent with Luintel and Khan
(1999), we used 8% of the depreciation rate and averaged the first three-year growth rate to obtain the
initial capital stock.
228 E. P. Davis and Y.-W. Hu
Q*i, t=eai+cit+ei, tr(Pi, t)lir(K*i, t)bi
LnQ*i, t=ai+cit+liLnPi, t+biLnK
*
i, t+ei, t (5)
where
Q*i, t=
Qi, t
Li, t
and K*i, t=
Ki, t
Li, t
ci=l+v1i, li=l+v2i and bi=w+v3i
where Q*j,t is output per unit labour and Ki,t
* is capital per unit labour. The model
shown in Equation (5) is the standard formulation of Swamy’s Random Coefficient
Model (RCM) (Swamy and Tavlas, 1995), where we can allow for heterogeneity
across countries in terms of time trend (t), pension fund assets (LnP) and capital per
unit labour (LnK*). We view this model as appropriate in that pension fund assets’
impact on output might show marked differentials across countries. Following this
model, and proxying the labour supply by total population, we regress capital per
head (LnK*) and pension fund assets/GDP (LnP) on output per head (LnQ*) (which
proxies for economic growth in this paper), using various econometric techniques. We
estimate with and without the time trend (t), which may capture other influences on
production relations such as structural reforms. Following Arestis et al. (2004) we do
not include some of the standard variables typically entered in cross-sectional cross-
country growth regressions such as years of schooling, as well as corruption, social
capital, inequality, and rule of law. On the one hand, it would not have been feasible to
build an annual time series for these variables. Furthermore, we consider that a gen-
eralized production function estimation is the appropriate specification for the issue in
hand and using panel data with fixed effects and a time trend (in some specifications)
will capture any relevant differences in growth performance across countries.
3. Data and stationarity tests
Before describing estimation, we outline issues in data construction and unit root
tests. Regarding the calculations ofQ* and K* we use standard macro-economic data
from the World Development Indicators, 2003 (WDI) database. As noted, in line
with Arestis et al. (2004) we proxy the labour force in measures of output per unit
labour and capital per unit labour by the total population, since consistent series on
labour force do not exist for most of the sample countries. The capital stock is derived
by the perpetual inventory method. Consistent with Luintel and Khan (1999), we
used an 8% depreciation rate and averaged the first three-year growth rate to obtain
the initial capital stock.
Pension fund asset data were collected from a variety of sources as set out in the
Appendix. Regarding the data observation period, in general for capital per head and
output per head we have data for years between 1960 and 2002. But pension data are
typically shorter; for OECD countries, e.g. the UK and the US, we have data ranging
from 1960s to 2002, while for many EMEs, e.g. Brazil, the data available are rela-
tively limited.
Before proceeding to formal panel regression analysis, the first step is to examine
our data’s stationarity. There are a number of ways to test panel data’s stationarity
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(Maddala and Wu, 1999; Baltagi, 2001). In this study, in order to check our results’
robustness, we use three different but commonly quoted tests, i.e. one designed by
Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) (hereafter LLC), one by Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003)
(hereafter IPS), and the last one by Hadri (2000). Consider the following model
yi, t=riyi, tx1+Xi, tdi+ei, t i=1, . . .N : t=1, . . .T (6)
where y is our variable of interest ; X is a vector of exogenous variables, including
fixed effects and/or a time trend, or simply a constant, based on the modelers’
assumptions. ei,t are i.i.d. (0, s
2
e). As customary, t proxies time, while i proxies
country. The principal difference between LLC and IPS is the assumption made on ri.
LLC proposes that ri=r, implying the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in
Equation (6) is the same across countries, while, under IPS, ri is allowed to vary
across countries. Given that in our sample, both OECD countries and EMEs are
included, we put more emphasis on the latter test, i.e. Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003),
in that there might be heterogeneity across countries. Both LLC and IPS tests are
extended versions of time series’ Augmented Dickey–Fuller test (ADF) into the
context of panel data. The formulation is as follows
Dyi, t=byi, tx1+ ;
pi
j=1
ri, jDyi, txj+Xi, tdi+ei, t i=1, . . .N : t=1, . . .T (7)
LLC tests the null hypothesis of b=0, while IPS is testing that of bi=0 for all i. In
addition, for the IPS test, t-bar statistics is used, which are formed as a simple average
of the individual t statistics for testing bi=0 in Equation (7), namely
txbarNT=Nx1 ;
N
i=1
tiT (8)
Both LLC and IPS are commonly used in the current empirical literature for panel
data. It has been argued, however, that they both suffer from the lack of power
(Hadri, 2000). In other words, the null hypothesis of a unit root tends to be accepted
or not rejected unless there is strong evidence to the alternative, one form of type II
error (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993; Greene, 2003). Therefore, it is suggested to
test a null of stationarity as well as a null of a unit root. One well-known test for the
null of no unit root is that proposed by Hadri (2000). Hadri testing is a residual-based
Lagrange multiplier (LM) test. Consider the model
yi, t=ri, t+bit+ei, t (9)
where ri, t=ri, tx1+mi, t, a random walk. The LM statistic is formulated as follows
LM=
1
N;
N
i
1
T2;
T
t=1S
2
i, t
sˆ2e
(10)
where
Si, t= ;
t
j=1
eˆi, j and sˆ
2
e=
1
NT
;
N
i=1
;
T
t=1
eˆ2i, t
eˆi, j is the estimated residual from Equation (9), Si,t is the partial sum of residuals,
while sˆ2e is the estimate of the error variance. Hadri’s residual-based LM test for
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the null of stationarity is promising in that it increases the power of testing for the null
of a unit root. One problem associated with Hadri (2000), however, is that, like LLC
(2003), it assumes the homogeneity of coefficients of ri=r in Equation (6). As we
mentioned earlier, in our study, we use a dataset covering both OECD countries and
EMEs; therefore, an assumption that r varies across sections might be more appro-
priate.
Table 3 presents the results of the panel unit root tests. For the log of the pension
assets to GDP ratio (LnP) our results, under all three testing approaches, are in
favour of non-stationarity in levels, and stationarity in first differences, implying that
LnP is an I(1) variable. Regarding the log-levels of output per head (LnQ*) and
capital per head (LnK*), under IPS and LLC, the null hypothesis of non-stationarity
could not be rejected for this panel of 38 countries. But after first differencing, the null
hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected and the alternative hypothesis of station-
arity be accepted. This is consistent with our assumption that LnQ* and LnK* are
also I(1) series. By employing the Hadri (2000) test, however, we could reject the
hypothesis of no unit root under both levels and first differences. After second dif-
ferencing, LnQ* and LnK* become stationary, as the null of stationarity could not
be rejected. This is intriguing and implies that LnQ* and LnK* are I(2) variables if
only based on Hadri. But, it is worth noting again that Hadri (2000) assumes a
common unit root process, which, as we have motioned earlier, is less relevant in this
study. Therefore, together with other two testing procedures, we believe LnP, LnQ*,
and LnK* are all non-stationary and I(1) variables.
4. Dynamic OLS estimation
If variables are non-stationary, particularly in the case of time series data, but the
common residual terms are stationary, i.e. I(0), then we say these variables are co-
integrated and economic theory as set out in Section 2 suggests forces which tend to
Table 3. Panel unit root test (38 countries, 20EMEs+18OECD)
Variable
Level 1st difference
2nd difference
IPS
(2003)
LLC
(2002)
Hadri
(2000)
IPS
(2003)
LLC
(2002)
Hadri
(2000) Hadri (2000)
LnP 9.37 9.21 20.76*** x14.86*** x18.42*** 2.70*** 1.24
p-value 0.99 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.11
LnQ* 8.09 3.11 26.30*** x21.99*** x22.07*** 5.22*** 0.88
p-value 0.99 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.19
LnK* 12.10 4.49 24.28*** x4.11*** x2.08** 8.17*** x0.46
p-value 0.99 0.99 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.68
Notes : LnP : log of pension fund assets/GDP. LnQ*: log of output per head. LnK*: capital
stock per head. Panel unit root tests are based on Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003), Levin, Lin, and
Chu (2002) and Hadri (2000). The null hypothesis of IPS and LLC is non-stationarity, while
that of Hadri is stationarity. *** significant at 1%. ** significant at 5%.
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keep such series together, and do not let them drift too far apart (Banerjee et al.,
1993). In addition, if variables are co-integrated, our estimates are super-consistent.
In other words, our estimates are not only consistent, but also converge to their true
values more quickly than normal (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993).
In this section, we seek to identify the cointegrating relation between pension assets
and output in the context of our theoretical model on a panel basis by using the
dynamic OLS (DOLS) cointegrating panel estimator. In panel data, Kao (1999) finds
that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is biased, in that the t-statistics di-
verge, so the inference is not reliable. The fully modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator is
argued to be able to correct such bias in certain cases. The FMOLS was first proposed
by Philips and Hansen (1990), and extended to the context of heterogeneous panels
by Pedroni (1997), and then developed further in Philips and Moon (1999). Based on
the simulation results from the Monte Carlo experiments, Kao and Chiang (2000),
however, prove that under both contexts of homogeneous and heterogeneous panels,
dynamic OLS (DOLS) is superior to fully modified OLS (FMOLS) and other OLS
estimators. The advantages of DOLS over FMOLS are no requirement for initial
conditions and non-parametric correction.7 The DOLS model, used in our paper and
following Stock and Watson (1993) is as follows
Yi, t=a+bXi, t+ ;
n
j=xn
cDXi, t+ei, t (11)
where i and t are country and time indices respectively, as is conventional. Yi,t is the
dependent variable, i.e. log output per head (LnQ*). Xi,t is a vector of explanatory
variables, i.e. log pension fund assets/GDP, and log capital per head (LnK*). DXi,t is
the first difference of Xi,t, thereby introducing dynamic structure into the equation.
The coefficients of Xi,t give the accumulative/total effects. In addition, the length of
leads and lags for DXi,t has to be defined. The inclusion of these nuisance parameters
in Equation (11) means we can obtain coefficient estimates with satisfactory limiting
distribution properties (Kao and Chiang, 2000; Kao et al., 1999). As mentioned by
Kao and Chiang, however, it is difficult to choose the optimal length of leads and
lags, which is a major drawback of the DOLS estimator. But, the practice is to use
one and/or two leads and lags.
Results are given in Tables 4a and Table 4b, where our main focus is on the sign,
size, and significance of the variable LnP, the log of the pension fund assets/GDP
ratio, which indicates the shift in the production function. As noted above, it is
arbitrary to choose the length of leads and lags in the DOLS model, but the practice is
to use one or two leads/lags (Mark and Sul, 2002; Kao et al., 1999). In this paper, in
order to check the robustness of DOLS model as in Pelgrin et al. (2002), we used both
one lead/lag and two leads/lags. We split our dataset according to two dimensions,
i.e. OECD/EMEs, and with trend/no trend. Use of a trend is consistent with
McCoskey and Kao (1999) where they use a time trend to identify the potential
7 We also consider DOLS to be more appropriate than system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
of Arellano and Bover (1995), since GMM is most appropriate when N is large and T is small (Bond,
2002). But in our dataset neither is the case; for example, we only have data covering 38 countries, while
observations range from five years to 35 years.
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beneficial effect of technological advances on growth over time, as well as structural
reform not related to pensions. In addition, as we have noted earlier, the variable
capital per head (LnK*) is not stationary even after first differencing based on Hadri
test, which might be due to the presence of a deterministic trend. Therefore, the
Table 4a. Estimates from dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimations (1 lead and 1 lag).
Dependent variable – Ln Q* (37 countries)
Estimated by panel fixed effects GLS with cross section weights.
All OECD EMEs
No trend With trend No trend With trend No trend With trend
Time trend 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.006***
LnP 0.047*** 0.001 0.065*** 0.015*** 0.036*** 0.019***
LnK* 0.707*** 0.549*** 0.662*** 0.385*** 0.71*** 0.624***
Adjusted R-squared 0.999 0.999 0.98 0.99 0.997 0.998
S.E. of regression 0.051 0.042 0.046 0.031 0.056 0.053
OBS 570 570 383 383 187 187
No. of countries 37 37 18 18 19 19
Memo: LnP with
SUR estimation
0.074*** 0.021***
Notes : LnP : log of pension fund assets/GDP. LnQ*: log of output per head. LnK*: capital
stock per head. ***, significant at 1%; **, significant at 5%; *, significant at 10%. OBS,
number of observations.
Table 4b. Estimates from dynamic OLS (DOLS) estimations (2 leads and 2 lags).
Dependent variable – Ln Q* (33 countries)
Estimated by panel fixed effects GLS with cross section weights.
All OECD EMEs
No trend With trend No trend With trend No trend With trend
Time trend 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.005***
LnP 0.051*** x0.001 0.068*** 0.012** 0.058*** 0.049***
LnK* 0.704*** 0.542*** 0.650*** 0.375*** 0.713*** 0.653***
Adjusted R-squared 0.997 0.997 0.982 0.991 0.998 0.998
S.E. of regression 0.048 0.04 0.043 0.029 0.053 0.05
OBS 498 498 347 347 150 150
No. of countries 33 33 18 18 15 15
Memo: Ln P with
SUR estimation
0.078*** 0.016***
Notes : LnP : log of pension fund assets/GDP. LnQ*: log of output per head. LnK*: capital
stock per head. ***, significant at 1%; **, significant at 5%; *, significant at 10%. OBS,
number of observations.
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specification with a trend utilized here might be able to deal with this issue. In
order to allow for our data to have a deterministic trend as well as to allow for the
potential effect of technological advances, we specified a model with a trend as well
as without both in this section and for the Mean-Group and Johansen results re-
ported below.
As regards the coefficient of LnP, in Table 4a where we used one lead/lag of the
dynamic terms, five out of six estimates are significant and positive as expected,
covering all three country groups. In Table 4b where we used two leads/lags, results
are similar. In each case, for the All-countries estimation, the estimate without the
trend is positive and statistically significant, while the estimate with the trend is in-
significant, suggesting heterogeneity, which is manifest when the time trend is in-
cluded. All the EME and OECD estimates are positive and significant. Meanwhile,
the time trend term tends to be positive and significant under all cases. It implies that
technological advances and structural reforms over time improve the relation of
capital and labour to output. Its inclusion means the pension variable is not proxying
an omitted trend. The estimates for LnK* are very satisfactory, in that all are stat-
istically significant at 1%, and positive at the range of 0.3–0.8. Finally, the adjusted
R-square ratios are quite high in all cases. Note that differences in the size of the
coefficients between the one and two lead/lag specification may relate largely to the
difference in country composition, where the former uses data from 37 countries,
the latter from 33.
As regards the size of the LnP coefficients, they are in each case smaller when the
time trend is included, implying that there are technical and structural changes that
the trend is capturing, which is otherwise incorporated in the pension assets variable.
But as noted, for OECD and EME groups and for each lag specification, the coef-
ficients are significant and positive with the trend as well as without it. This parameter
measures the total or cumulative effect of pension assets/GDP on output per capita.
Therefore, it implies that a 1% increase in LnP raises LnQ* (i.e. economic growth)
by a minimum 0.012% under the case of OECD with trend, and a maximum 0.068%
under the OECD no trend as in Table 4b. The OECD pension variable tends to be
larger when the trend is omitted but smaller than in EMEs when the trend is included,
where the latter results are more plausible. One would expect larger coefficients for
EMEs, as is generally the case throughout our results. Such a finding is consistent
with economic convergence theory (Sala-I-Martin, 1996) – i.e. poor countries are
expected to grow faster than rich countries – as well as with recent empirical results
by Beck and Levine (2004) and Beck et al. (2000), implying financial development is
more beneficial to growth in EMEs.
The basic results are estimated by unbalanced-panel GLS with fixed effects and
cross-section weights. To check robustness, we sought to re-estimate with the
Seemingly-Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique, which allows for correlations in
the error terms. This was not feasible for the All or the EME group, because many of
the observation series were too short. However, as shown in Tables 4a and 4b, it is
apparent that for the OECD group, using SUR does not change the parameter esti-
mates for LnP markedly, implying that our result of a clear ‘shift effect ’ in the
production function from pension funding is a robust one.
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5. Dynamic heterogeneous models
In view of the possibility that the impact of pension funds on economic growth may
vary across countries, and also consistent with the suggestion of McCoskey and Kao
(1999), we in this section seek to look further at the long-run relationship by em-
ploying dynamic heterogeneous models. Pesaran and Smith (1995) present a number
of different estimation procedures for estimating a dynamic panel data model across
heterogeneous countries, namely the mean-group estimator, aggregate time-series
estimator, pooled mean-group estimator and cross-section estimator. Due to other
approaches’ limitations8 as well as data availability, we use only the mean-group
estimator in this section. The dynamic model we use in this section is specified as
follows
LnQ*i, t=ai+cit+Q1iLnQ
*
i, tx1+l1iLnPit+b1iLnK
*
i, t+ei, t (12)
Equation (12) is the standard formulation of a dynamic heterogeneous panel model,
consistent with Pesaran and Smith’s (1995) specification. However, with the con-
sideration of saving degree of freedom, we include only one lag of the dependent
variable on the right-hand side of the function rather than adding one lag of all
independent variables like the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) estimation used
by Pesaran and Smith (1995). Pesaran (1997) and Pesaran and Smith (1995) argue
that the use of the ARDL estimation procedure has advantages over the fully modi-
fied (FM) OLS estimator designed by Philips and Hansen (PH) (1990) for time series
co-integration relations, e.g. in that the tests based on PH method have a clear
tendency to over-reject in small samples and also show larger bias.
Based on the mean-group estimation procedure, we ran regressions for each indi-
vidual country, then averaged across countries using two methods to obtain the av-
erage long-run coefficients. According to the first method, the long-run elasticities of
LnQ* with respect to LnP and LnK* can be calculated using the formula, gi=
lˆi=1xQˆi and ji=bˆi=1xQˆi respectively. lˆi, Qˆi, and bˆi are the estimated values of the
corresponding parameters in Equation (12). Then the average long-run coefficients in
terms of LnP and LnK* can be computed as g=Nx1;Ni=1gi and j=N
x1;Ni=1ji
respectively.
The second method, as presented by Pesaran and Smith (1995), maintains that the
average long-run coefficients can also be calculated using the means of short-term
coefficients, namely
g=l=1xQ and j=b=1xQ
where
Q=Nx1 ;
N
i=1
Qˆi, l=Nx1 ;
N
i=1
lˆi, and b=Nx1 ;
N
i=1
bˆi
The significance levels or t-values of gi and ji were calculated by following the for-
mulas, txvalueg=gˆi=se( gˆi) and txvaluej=jˆi=se( jˆii) respectively, where the standard
8 For example, the pooled estimator assumes that the coefficients are homogeneous across sections, an
assumption which we wish to ease here.
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errors were computed as the square root of the variance of gˆi and jˆi divided by the
number of groups (Smith and Fuertes, 2004).
Results,9 according to the mean-group estimators using Methods 1 and 2 are
summarized in Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c. As in Section 4, we ran three separate
Table 5a. Heterogeneous panel estimates of mean long run output per head (Ln Q*)
elasticities. (16 countries, 11OECD+5EMEs), with trend
Method 1* Method 2*
LnP (g) LnK* (j) LnP (g) LnK* (j)
All 0.120*** 1.025*** 0.08*** 1.0***
OECD 0.009 0.936*** 0.012 0.947***
EMEs 0.453*** 1.284*** 0.311*** 1.189***
Notes : See Table 3. Method 1 is the average of long run elasticities across countries, while
Method 2 derives long runs from means of short run elasticities. Both methods are based on
Pesaran and Smith (1995), calculation of t values based on Smith and Fuertes (2004). See
Section 5 in text for details.
Table 5b. Heterogeneous panel estimates of mean long run output per head (Ln Q*)
elasticities. (10 countries, 7OECD+3EMEs), with trend
Method 1* Method 2*
Ln P (g) Ln K* (j) Ln P (g) Ln K* (j)
All 0.204*** 1.083*** 0.11*** 1.01***
OECD 0.073*** 0.953*** 0.047*** 0.95***
EMEs 0.531* 1.38*** 0.32* 1.22***
Notes : See Table 3 and Table 5a.
Table 5c. Heterogeneous panel estimates of mean long-run output per head
(Ln Q*) elasticities. (16 countries, 11OECD+5EMEs), without trend
Method 1* Method 2*
Ln P (g) Ln K* (j) Ln P (g) Ln K* (j)
All 0.137*** 0.509*** 0.094*** 0.549***
OECD 0.129** 0.635*** 0.061** 0.724***
EMEs 0.189*** 0.087 0.167*** 0.167
Notes : See Table 3 and Table 5a.
9 Underlying results for individual country coefficients with a time trend are given in Davis and Hu (2004).
The impact of the capital per head ratio was generally positive in 15 out of 16 estimates. Regarding the
pension assets/GDP ratio, 11 out of 16 estimates show a positive sign, although some are insignificant.
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regressions by country groupings, i.e. all 16 countries, 11 OECD countries, and five
EMEs. Table 5a presents results for the ARDL with time trend, based on all 16
countries, while Table 5b is based on ten countries, excluding Canada, Japan,
Malaysia, South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland. We dropped those countries since
most of coefficient estimates (at least three out of four estimates) for those countries
are not significant. Therefore, their presence might distort our results from the mean-
group estimators. One of the reasons pension assets ratios are insignificant in those
countries might be the simple ARDL model we specified. However, in order to keep
the specification consistent across countries, and to follow the methodology by
Pesaran and Smith (1995), we retain it in this section. Finally, in Table 5c we show
results for all 16 countries without a time trend.
Results in Table 5a are satisfactory and encouraging, as all estimates under the two
methods and three groups are positive, indicating a positive average long-run re-
lationship between pension assets/GDP, capital stock per head and output per head
(i.e. economic growth). For example, for OECD countries, a 1% increase in the
capital stock raises output by 0.936% under method 1 and 0.947% under method 2.
These two estimates are quite close to each other. In fact, it is this estimation ro-
bustness that leads us to use the simplified model compared with Pesaran and Smith
(1995). Concerning the log of pension assets/GDP, we find that All countries and
EMEs have highly significant coefficients, with the long-run effect being around three
times larger in EMEs than in the All country average. Note, however, that this is
strongly affected by the result for Chile, without which the EME result would be
similar to that from DOLS set out in Section 4. Whereas the estimates for OECD
countries under both methods in Table 5a are not significant, as noted above, some
country-by-country results feature largely insignificant coefficients. In order to ad-
dress this problem, we excluded those countries, and the subsequent results are pres-
ented in Table 5b. We still have the expected signs and all the LnP variables are now
significant and positive. The effect is, unsurprisingly, larger for EMEs than OECD
countries, and All countries. The third set of results in Table 5c are for the equations
without the trend. Here we find that for all 16 countries, there is a significant and
positive effect of LnP, thus supporting the result with trend. The coefficients are
larger than with the time trend for OECD countries, but, reflecting the result for
Chile, they are smaller for All countries and EMEs. The EME coefficients are again
consistently larger than for OECD countries.
6. Country-by-country Johansen cointegration test
As noted in Section 3, pension fund assets/GDP, capital per head and output per
head are all I(1) variables, so, besides panel work, we may be interested in whether
there exists a long-run cointegrating relationship between them on a country-by-
country basis to allow for heterogeneity. In this section we employ the VAR-based
Meanwhile, the long-run effect of LnK* (the ratio of the coefficient on LnK* to 1 minus the coefficient on
LnQ*(x1)) is generally around 1, and the pension asset variable is usually around 0.1. The average
short-run coefficients show that a 1% increase in pension assets leads to an immediate rise in output by
0.022%, while capital’s contribution is larger at 0.283%. The average lagged dependent variable is 0.718.
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Johansen cointegration test (Vector Error Correction Model) using the methodology
developed by Johansen (1991 and 1995). The specification is as follows
yt=A(L)ytx1+et (13)
where A(L)=A1+A2+   +AkLkx1, yt is a k-vector of I(1) variables, i.e. LnQ*,
LnK*, and LnP in this paper. L is the lag operator, and the lag order is selected based
on a range of information criteria, i.e. AIC (Akaike information criterion) and SC
(Schwarz information criterion). Generally, the suggested lag order is two years,
although in some cases it extended to three years. If Equation (13) is written in
VAR format, then we have
Dyt=C(L)Dytx1+Pytxk+et (14)
where Ci=x(1xA1x   xAi), i=1, . . . kx1 and P=x(1xA1x   xAi) or P=
a*bk Here a is the speed of adjustment from short-run deviation to long-run equi-
librium, and bk is the cointegrating vector, which thus represents the long-run coef-
ficients. Based on Granger’s representation theorem, the Johansen VAR-based
cointegration test is to first estimate thePmatrix from an unrestricted VAR and then
test whether the restriction suggested by the reduced rank of P – the number of
cointegrating relations – is rejected.
Again, we consider two slightly different specifications, i.e. one without a trend
and the other with trend. We group our sample into OECD countries and EMEs.
Tables 6a and 6b give results of our first specification, i.e. without a trend. In most
cases, the Trace and Maximum-Eigenvalue statistics indicate a co-integrating re-
lationship between our variables, and the null hypothesis of non-cointegration is
rejected at either the 5% or 10% level. Note that the signs of coefficients are opposite
to those of the impact of the variable on LnQ* because the equations are normalized
in the form 0=LnQ* – a1 LnP – a2 LnK*.
As shown in Table 6a, in nine of the 11 OECD countries10 the sign of LnP is
negative, as expected. For almost all of these countries, pension fund growth thus has
a statistically significant and positive relationship with output per head, the extent of
which varies from 0.04 for Sweden to 0.27 for Germany. The small size of the positive
effect in Sweden could also be due to the restrictions in the Swedish ATP scheme in
equity investment and to state management of the fund. Regarding LnK* (capital per
head), our estimates are satisfactory, as all coefficients are negative, implying a
positive linkage between economic output and the capital stock across OECD
countries. In addition, the estimates of coefficients of LnK* are quite close to each
other; for seven out of 11 countries, it is between 0.55–0.80, implying a comparable
production function relationship among developed OECD countries. All estimates
except in Canada, Sweden, and Switzerland, are less than 1, consistent with our
model in Section 2, which suggests that the b-elasticity of aggregate output with
respect to capital should not be greater than 1.
10 Exceptions are Canada and Switzerland where the sign of coefficients on LnP is positive, implying a
negative relationship between pension assets growth and economic output in the normalized co-
integrating relation.
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Results for EMEs are given in Table 6b. All coefficient estimates for LnP except
for Malaysia are negative, implying a beneficial effect of pensions on growth. For
example, for Chile, a 1% increase in pension assets can contribute to economic
growth by 0.14%; this complements findings by Schmidt-Hebbel (1999), who shows
that 0.1–0.4% of the 1.5% increase in total factor productivity (TFP) in Chile in the
1980s and 1990s was attributed to pension reform. As for LnK*, for four countries
the sign is negative, consistent with our findings earlier. In other words, in these
countries, growth in the capital/labour ratio accompanies a rise in economy-wide
productivity.
Tables 7a and 7b show the comparable results for the cointegrating vector with
trend. Virtually all of the Trace and Maximum Eigenvalue tests show cointegration.
The results are broadly comparable : in Table 7a we have eight out of 11 results
showing a positive effect of LnP on output per capita, while for LnK* it is nine out of
11. In Table 7b we have three out of five with a positive effect of pension fund assets
Table 6a. Co–integrating coefficients vector without trend; normalised on Ln Q*.
OECD countries
LnQ* LnP LnK* Trace Max-eigenvalue
Australia 1 x0.23*** x0.02 36.49 25.02
[7.67] [0.16]
Belgium 1 x0.005 x0.68*** 30.4 14.4
[0.17] [6.42]
Canada 1 0.29*** x1.25*** 43.3 26.2
[4.83] [11.36]
Denmark 1 x0.11*** x0.76*** 44.0 27.93
[13.16] [17.18]
Germany 1 x0.27*** x0.53*** 33.2 17.5
[11.33] [4.56]
Japan 1 x0.12*** x0.56*** 41.0 26.24
[7.22] [16.62]
Netherlands 1 x0.11** x0.67*** 27.42 23.51
[3.8] [3.3]
Sweden 1 x0.04* x1.21*** 30.02 25.24
[1.62] [42.14]
Switzerland 1 0.18*** x1.23*** 35.26 22.09
[3.60] [9.46]
UK 1 x0.06*** x0.78*** 33.65 25.10
[12.49] [39.13]
USA 1 x0.04 x0.75*** 31.54 22.62
[1.49] [17.47]
Notes : See Table 3. Co-integration estimation is based on Johansen methodology (1991 and
1995). T values are under estimates of corresponding coefficients. Lag length is selected based
on a range of criteria statistics, e.g. AIC (Akaike information criterion) and SC (Schwarz
information criterion). T-values are in square brackets. Under both Trace and Max-eigenvalue
statistics, all countries indicate a co-integration relationship at 5% or 10% level ; the only
exceptions are Belgium and Germany under Max-eigenvalue statistics.
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Table 7a. Co-integrating coefficients vector with trend; normalized on Ln Q*;
OECD countries
LnQ* LnP LnK* Trend Trace Max-eigenvalue
Australia 1 x0.23*** x0.20 0.00 44.19 25.52
[7.67] [0.56] [0.30]
Belgium 1 x0.02*** x0.03 x0.02*** 74.30 50.30
[6.05] [0.98] [27.68]
Canada 1 0.26*** x0.67*** x0.01*** 27.02 20.39
[8.67] [6.09] [5.50]
Denmark 1 x0.14*** x0.95*** 0.004 29.35 23.77
[4.39] [8.04] [x1.32]
Germany 1 0.50*** 2.87*** x0.07*** 42.03 21.74
[x3.30] [x2.96] [4.57]
Japan 1 x0.12*** x0.73*** 0.01 46.34 27.77
[5.79] [5.40] [x1.45]
Netherlands 1 x0.14* x0.72*** 0.002 46.34 27.77
[1.66] [3.16] [x0.29]
Sweden 1 x0.03 4.08*** x0.07*** 71.27 47.82
[0.65] [x7.97] [10.44]
Switzerland 1 0.15*** x0.66** x0.017* 47.0 23.4
[3.42] [2.46] [1.66]
UK 1 x0.16*** x1.69*** 0.025*** 28.20 20.83
[5.5] [6.6] [x3.8]
USA 1 x0.11** x1.48*** x0.02* 42.01 23.14
[2.20] [3.08] [1.62]
Notes : See Table 3. Under both Trace andMax-eigenvalue statistics, all countries indicate a co-
integration relationship at 5% or 10% level ; the only exception is Germany under Max-
eigenvalue statistics.
Table 6b. Co-integrating coefficients vector without trend; normalised on Ln Q*.
Emerging market economies (EMEs)
LnQ* LnP LnK* Trace Max-eigenvalue
Brazil 1 x0.07*** x0.12 35.70 25.20
[13.20] [0.36]
Chile 1 x0.14*** x0.48*** 49.60 34.80
[23.00] [35.82]
Korea 1 x0.27*** x0.71*** 45.1 25.8
[5.88] [28.18]
Malaysia 1 0.23 x0.8*** 35.4 24.9
[5.75] [26.67]
South Africa 1 x0.14*** 0.19*** 105.6 60.9
[17.20] [x3.80]
Notes : See Table 3. Under both Trace and Max–Eigenvalue statistics, all countries indicate a
co–integration relationship at 5% or 10% level.
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on output per head, and in four out of five cases for LnK*. Note that even where the
cointegrating vector has a ‘wrong’ sign, the dynamics may be such as to generate a
long-term positive effect of pension assets on output per head. As regards the trend,
among 11 OECD countries, six show a negative coefficient, which implies (given
normalization) that technological advances over time enhance economic growth. The
same finding is obtained by McCoskey and Kao (1999), where six out of eight OECD
countries are identified to have a positive and significant trend. Similar results are
found for EMEs (Table 7b) where three out of five countries show significant trends
enhancing economic growth.
We now move on to impulse response tests derived from the Vector-Error-
Correction Model underlying the Johansen results. The underlying rationale behind
impulse responses is that a shock to one variable not only directly affects the variable
itself, but also is transmitted to all of other endogenous variables through the dy-
namic structure of the VECM. In our example, it implies that pension fund assets/
GDP can directly impact on output per head, but it might also affect capital per head
(e.g. by boosting saving), which in turn induces improvement on output. Results are
based on the Pesaran and Shin (1998) generalized response approach. Technically, it
constructs an orthogonal set of innovations that does not depend on the VAR or-
dering. The generalized impulse responses from an innovation to the jth variable are
derived by applying a variable specific Cholesky factor computed with the jth variable
at the top of the Cholesky ordering. It avoids the arbitrariness of the Cholesky or-
dering.
We specify a 25-year window, given that it is expected that pension fund assets have
a relatively long-period effect on both LnQ* and LnK*, and hence a shorter period,
e.g. ten years might not be long enough to capture the long-run effect of LnP. The
results are summarized in Table 8. It can be seen that the results are virtually all
positive over five-, ten-, and 25-year horizons. Among OECD countries, the excep-
tions are Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and small open economies, growth
Table 7b. Co-integrating coefficients vector with trend; normalised on Ln Q*;
Emerging market economies (EMEs)
LnQ* LnP LnK* Trend Trace Max-Eigenvalue
Brazil 1 0.16*** 0.07*** x0.03*** 84.50 49.10
[20.33] [14.11] [x24.55]
Chile 1 x0.31*** x0.70*** 0.04*** 65.20 41.70
[10.33] [10.00] [4.11]
Korea 1 x0.40*** x0.95** 0.02 33.62 23.94
[4.15] [2.37] [x0.61]
Malaysia 1 0.23*** x0.69*** x0.007*** 40.4 25.1
[x6.3] [8.2] [6.07]
South Africa 1 x0.13*** x0.24*** x0.01*** 137.1 83.9
[29.89] [5.59] [10.92]
Notes : See Table 3. * Under both Trace and Max-eigenvalue statistics, all countries indicate a
co-integration relationship at 5% or 10% level.
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in which is more dependent on external factors. Also, pension funds in those
countries tend to be defined benefit, which may reduce the beneficial effect on labour
markets of pension funding. Only in Switzerland is the negative effect sizeable,
however. With the trend we also find a negative effect for Brazil, which again is
characterized by defined-benefit funds. Note that in Malaysia, Germany, and
Canada, the positive impact arises despite a negative implied effect of pension assets
in the cointegrating vector, and the opposite for the Netherlands and Belgium. This
illustrates that the dynamics of the VECM can be such as to offset the sign of the
long-run effect for protracted periods.
Looking at the summary results at the bottom of the table, we see that, consistent
with the various parameter estimates in Sections 4, 5, and 6, there is on average a
positive effect of pension fund growth on economic growth (as proxied by output per
head in this paper), and this is significantly larger in EMEs than in OECD countries,
even when the three OECD countries with a negative effect are excluded. As regards
time patterns, OECD country impulse responses tend to be smoother than those of
EMEs. This may link to economic vulnerability, and greater sensitivity to external
factors, such as currency crises and policy shifts.
Table 8. Summary of impulse responses of log output per head to log pension
assets/GDP
Percent response to one standard deviation change.
Without trend With trend
Years 5 10 25 5 10 25
Australia 1.13 1.15 1.14 1.10 1.12 1.11
Belgium x0.12 x0.13 x0.20 x0.04 0.09 0.05
Canada 0.64 0.24 0.26 0.05 x0.06 x0.09
Denmark 0.24 0.43 0.42 x0.10 0.39 0.33
Germany 0.71 1.67 1.87 0.40 0.86 1.45
Japan 1.24 0.89 0.96 0.94 0.76 0.79
Netherlands x0.28 x0.31 x0.41 x0.32 x0.36 x0.47
Sweden 1.23 1.05 1.05 0.56 1.31 0.84
Switzerland x1.13 x0.98 x1.00 x1.13 x0.98 x1.00
UK 0.25 0.46 0.43 0.23 0.61 0.55
USA x0.04 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.01 0.22
Brazil 1.52 x0.21 0.48 x0.40 x0.45 x0.28
Chile 1.26 2.38 1.80 3.71 5.23 2.66
Korea 3.43 4.37 4.02 4.23 4.82 4.41
Malaysia 2.45 0.69 0.63 1.93 0.43 0.25
South Africa 4.10 3.82 3.87 4.01 4.15 4.28
All 1.04 0.97 0.96 0.95 1.12 0.94
OECD 0.35 0.41 0.42 0.16 0.34 0.34
OECDpositive 0.68 0.75 0.78 0.41 0.62 0.65
EME 2.55 2.21 2.16 2.70 2.84 2.26
Note : Based on Pesaran and Shin (1998) generalized response approach. See text for details.
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Turning to variance decompositions (Table 9), we see that the variance of pension
fund assets explains a considerable proportion of the variance of output per head in
many of the countries concerned. There is a considerably higher proportion explained
in EMEs than in OECD countries, suggestive of a greater potential contribution
pension reform can have on the wider economy in these countries. Furthermore,
whereas inclusion of a time trend in the VECM reduces the contribution of pension
assets both in OECD countries and EMEs, the reduction is proportionately much
larger for the former (from around 10% to 5%) than in the latter (from 30%
to 25%).
8. Conclusion
Pension funds have been expanding and will continue such a trend in coming decades
given the rapidly ageing population and the transition from unfunded systems to
funded systems such as the World Bank multi-pillar model. Research on the direct
link between pension funds growth and economic growth, however, is quite scarce. In
this paper, we sought to fill this gap. By employing a modified Cobb–Douglas pro-
duction function and a variety of econometric specifications, we found that pension
assets/GDP positively and significantly affects output per head, consistently for both
the OECD countries and EMEs, while effects are consistently larger for EMEs than
for OECD countries. This finding contributes to the existing literature and provided
Table 9. Variance decomposition: log pension fund assets/GDP on log output per head
Percent Without trend With trend
Years 5 10 25 5 10 25
Australia 4.71 4.58 4.53 4.48 4.47 4.50
Belgium 9.03 7.09 5.72 5.09 7.39 11.99
Canada 8.07 5.00 2.53 1.91 1.72 0.88
Denmark 5.47 8.14 11.95 2.38 4.13 7.79
Germany 0.91 21.74 33.37 10.44 3.73 2.30
Japan 5.74 5.04 4.35 4.09 3.75 3.58
Netherlands 0.63 0.33 0.18 0.56 0.34 0.39
Sweden 28.25 40.81 52.12 6.47 5.78 7.01
Switzerland 3.70 2.43 1.32 3.79 2.49 1.36
UK 11.60 16.35 24.54 7.74 9.75 13.60
USA 19.41 9.34 4.12 15.47 7.25 4.17
Brazil 8.79 8.80 12.22 2.80 2.59 1.91
Chile 34.89 48.82 54.52 25.43 30.49 28.03
Korea 26.48 22.66 20.99 29.49 25.56 23.90
Malaysia 67.34 45.80 44.19 74.42 58.06 56.66
South Africa 14.44 14.38 14.19 4.96 5.15 5.19
All 15.59 16.33 18.18 12.47 10.79 10.83
OECD 8.86 10.98 13.16 5.67 4.62 5.23
EME 30.39 28.09 29.22 27.42 24.37 23.14
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new empirical evidence on the debate regarding linkage between pension growth and
economic growth.
The overall policy implication of this research favours pension funding as a re-
sponse to the challenge of ageing, as it indeed appears to offer an additional benefit to
the economy in terms of productive efficiency, even if saving is not boosted at the
same time. As noted, emerging market countries benefit more than advanced
countries from these benefits. That said, it should be cautioned that not all countries
have the necessary administrative and organizational infrastructure to develop
successful pension funds (Holzmann and Hinz, 2005) so careful preparation and
attention to preconditions is necessary before launching such a pension reform.
Despite the above-mentioned contributions, this paper still has some caveats that
justify further research in the future. First, the number of observations is relatively
small when the heterogeneous panel and Johansen co-integration tests were conduc-
ted, which is particularly relevant for the EMEs regressions. Therefore, more data
could be used to improve statistical robustness of those results (it does not apply
strongly to the DOLS results). Second, structural effects were not directly addressed
in this paper. However, major structural changes (such as financial liberalization)
have taken place in some countries (but not in others) which impact on economic
growth, or at least have implication for the trajectory of economic development.
Hence, future research could be conducted to tackle this issue. We maintain, how-
ever, that these points are unlikely to controvert our main results, that pension re-
form boosts economic growth, given the DOLS results are less affected by data
limitations, and the positive effect is consistent in country-by-country estimation.
Meanwhile, the paper has not addressed the issue of how long the positive impact of
funding on growth may persist, which is also an issue of considerable interest.
Table 10. Summary of significant effects of log pension assets/GDP on log output
per head
Method/specification All OECD EMEs
DOLS panel
1 lead/lag no trend + + +
1 lead/lag with trend Ins + +
2 lead/lag no trend + + +
2 lead/lag with trend Ins + +
Heterogeneous panel
Method 1 all countries trend + Ins +
Method 2 all countries trend + Ins +
Method 1 subset trend + + +
Method 2 subset trend + + +
Method 1 all countries no trend + + +
Method 2 all countries no trend + + +
Johansen summary*
Without trend + (11/16 countries) + (7/11 countries) + (4/5 countries)
With trend + (10/16 countries) + (7/11 countries) + (3/5 countries)
Notes : Ins=insignificant * shows frequency of significant positive effect of LnP on LnQ*.
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Appendix: Variables, data sources and observation period
Country P Data source Q* K* Data source
Argentina 1994–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2001 WDI (2003)
Australia 1970–2003 OECD(2003),DS (2001),
Reserve bank of
Australia
1960–2002 1971–2001 WDI (2003)
Austria 1993–2000 OECD (2003) 1960–2002 1971–2001 WDI (2003)
Belgium 1981–1999 OECD (2003) 1960–2002 1971–2001 WDI (2003)
Bolivia 1997–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1965–2001 WDI (2003)
Brazil 1984–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1970–2001 WDI (2003)
Canada 1966–2000 OECD (2003), DS (2001) 1965–2002 1965–2001 WDI (2003)
Chile 1981–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2001 WDI (2003)
Colombia 1994–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2001 WDI (2003)
Denmark 1966–1999 OECD (2003), DS (2001) 1960–2002 1966–2001 WDI (2003)
Ecuador 1995–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1965–2001 WDI (2003)
Fiji 1994–2003 National Provident
Fund
1960–2002 N.A. WDI (2003)
Germany 1966–2000 OECD (2003), DS (2001) 1971–2002 1971–2001 WDI (2003)
Hungary 1998–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2000 WDI (2003)
Iceland 1980–2000 OECD (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2001 WDI (2003)
Indonesia 1991–1996 Social Security
Association
1960–2002 1979–2001 WDI (2003)
Italy 1990–2000 OECD (2003), DS (2001) 1960–2002 1965–2001 WDI (2003)
Japan 1969–2002 OECD(2003),DS (2001),
Institute of Pension
Research
1960–2002 1960–2001 WDI (2003)
Korea 1980–2000 OECD (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2002 WDI (2003)
Luxembourg 1985–1996 OECD (2003) 1960–2002 1965–2000 WDI (2003)
Malaysia 1975–2003 Bank Negara Malaysia 1960–2002 1960–2002 WDI (2003)
Mexico 1997–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2001 WDI (2003)
Netherlands 1967–2001 OECD (2003), DS (2001) 1960–2002 1971–2001 WDI (2003)
Norway 1980–1999 OECD (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2000 WDI (2003)
Panama 1998–2002 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1980–2002 WDI (2003)
Peru 1993–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2001 WDI (2003)
Philippine 1985–2002 Social Security System 1960–2002 1960–2002 WDI (2003)
Poland 1999–2003 FIAP (2003) 1990–2002 1990–2002 WDI (2003)
Portugal 1989–2000 OECD (2003) 1960–2002 1971–2001 WDI (2003)
Singapore 1983–2003 Central Provident Fund 1960–2002 1965–2002 WDI (2003)
South Africa 1980–1997 South African Reserve
Bank, Beck,
Demirguc–Kunt and
Levine (1999)
1960–2002 1960–2002 WDI (2003)
Spain 1988–2003 OECD (2003),
FIAP (2003)
1960–2002 1971–2001 WDI (2003)
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Appendix (cont.)
Country P Data source Q* K* Data source
Sri Lanka 1989–2000 Employees and
Provident Fund
1960–2002 1960–2002 WDI (2003)
Sweden 1966–2000 OECD (2003), DS (2001) 1960–2002 1965–2001 WDI (2003)
Switzerland 1970–1998 OECD (2003), DS (2001) 1960–2002 1965–2001 WDI (2003)
UK 1964–2002 OECD(2003),DS (2001),
Financial Statistics
(2003)
1960–2002 1970–2001 WDI (2003)
Uruguay 1996–2003 FIAP (2003) 1960–2002 1960–2001 WDI (2003)
USA 1966–2000 OECD (2003), DS (2001) 1960–2002 1960–2000 WDI (2003)
Notes : P : Pension fund assets/GDP. Q*: Output per head. K*: Capital stock per head. DS:
Davis and Steil (2001).
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